United States foreign policy after World War II often failed to accomplish its objectives and behaved counterproductive. Force replaced diplomacy. Military solutions trampled negotiations. Counter-insurgency produced insurgents. The U.S. identified anti-communism as its principal guide to foreign policy during the Cold War, but similar policies continued after the Soviet Union’s collapse and disintegration.
American foreign policies in Europe during the Cold War have been considered successful. However, a comprehensive review of American foreign policy towards countries in other regions and in different eras, including post Cold War Europe, expose a consistent lack of statesmanship, ineffective methods of diplomacy and a disposition to use military force. The most significant political signpost of the recent post Cold War era is the formation of socio-economic blocs that exclude the United States, the nation that is regarded as winner of the Cold War. An ever-enlarging European Union, a Latin America Mercour, which is composed of radical and less-friendly regimes to the U.S., and an Association of Southeast Asian nations plus three (ASEAN +China, Japan, South Korea), in which China is gaining a dominant role, are challenging U.S. political hegemony and economic leadership.
If the presentation appears one-sided, it is because U.S. administration policies have been one-sided and have exhibited patterns that caused international catastrophes. Interference in internal affairs of nations and direct American military involvement have not brought peace and stability to the world.
NOTE: This is the latest update of a previous article, and includes information occurring up to the year 2006. All facts have been verified and references appear within the article. There is no bibliography. Due to the lengthy discussion, specific sections can be addressed by using the links:
The European Scene
The Asian Scene
The Middle-East
African Scene
Central America and Caribbean
South America
The European Scene
“The Cold War really began with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917; and it triggered a hot war in 1939 as soon as the British and French squandered the chance to secure a firm military alliance with the Soviet Union.”
Michael Jabara Carley. 1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999.
During the Cold war, antagonists faced one another across European borders, but no military confrontations occurred between them. The U.S. stabilized Western Europe and prevented the Soviet Union from encroaching upon West European territory. The communist state maintained its sphere of influence in East Europe, and the U.S. reluctantly permitted this to happen. By late 1980, military burdens and internal policies greatly diminshed the power of the Soviet Union. The U.S. achieved its objectives without firing a bullet at its adversary. Nevertheless, the Cold War policies were not completely successful.
The forty year length of the Cold War created political (McCarthyism), social (polarization, crime and drugs) and economic (displacement of resources, budget deficits and inflation) tensions in the United States, especially during the 1960′s and 1970′s. It is entirely possible that the rigid policies of the Cold War dampened conflicts within the Soviet Union and hindered internal challenges to the communist system from occurring at an earlier time. Deterrence and détente, two key provisions of the Cold War stalemate, were conceived with the belief that conflict meant use of weapons of mass destruction and use of these weapons meant mutual destruction to both major powers. The philosophies deterred attack but stimulated an arms race throughout the world. China, India, Pakistan, and Israel have added nuclear weapons to their military arsenals. Other nations, such as North Korea and Iran, are seeking weapons of mass destruction to deter possible attacks upon them.
Russia, the principal remaining state of the Soviet Union, has a tepid relationship with the United States, while it increases economic ties with China and the European Union. After a decade of economic and social deterioration during Boris Yeltsin’s mismanagement, President Putin’s Russia has an expanding economy coupled with a slight drift back to the former Soviet Union’s centralized system. A “cool war” with the United States has started. Another “Cold War” is not predicted, but an independent-minded Russia will assuredly prevent U.S. interests from exercising control in nations close to Russia’s borders, and will counter attempts that undermine Russia’s economic activities in the Middle East.
The Russian challenge could once again threaten United States world leadership, just as it did at the start of 1946.
Greece – 1946
The Truman Doctrine permitted military and economic aid to anti-Communist forces in the 1946 Greek civil war. This support occurred despite the Soviet Union’s refusal to assist the Greek Communists in the struggle. The Truman Doctrine prevented a communist government from taking power in Greece, but the American interference in Greece affairs added to the initial post-war frictions between the East and the West and established a path to the Cold War.
Berlin – 1948
The four powers divided Berlin into specific zones of occupation. In early 1948, the western allies–United States, France and Great Britain–discussed the possibility of consolidating their three zones into one federated zone. On June 23, 1948, the ever wary Soviet Union reacted to the discussion and closed the Berlin border to allied vehicle and rail traffic.
The Soviet Union considered the allied sectors in isolated Berlin as espionage bases and not of any strategic value to the allies. A Soviet embargo of the Three Powers’ traffic became more than a case of harassment–it tested U.S. intentions in Berlin. The Soviet leaders expected the allies would compromise and evacuate Berlin. It didn’t happen. The Berlin airlift brought adequate supplies to West Berlin and the Soviet government halted the blockade after seven months. Allied resolve in the Berlin airlift convinced the Soviet leaders that the West would struggle for each advantage and the adversaries would not easily find rapport. The U.S. successful response to the Soviet embargo moved the Cold War to an “eyeball-to-eyeball” confrontation and initiated the drastic arms race.
The U.S. strengthened its economic and military position by cooperating in European recovery.
Marshall Plan – 1948 to 1960
The Marshall plan provided economic resources for West Europe to recover from the war. It is undoubtedly the finest U.S. foreign policy achievement. Proposed and guided by General George C. Marshall, the plan assured markets for U.S. exports and smoothed the transition from a war economy to a peace economy. It is an example of using U.S. policy in a “win-win” situation that benefits the American people and supplies sustenance to others.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – 1948 to 2006
The U.S. sponsored NATO grew in size and strength and prepared to act all through the Cold War years. Despite opportunities to provide assistance to East Europeans in their uprisings against Communist governments in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Hungary in 1956, the Czechs again in the Prague spring of 1968 and the Poles in the 70′s, NATO refrained from modifying its doctrine of only attacking after being attacked. In the post Cold War era, after the Soviet Union had been humbled and could not retaliate, NATO changed its position from a defensive alliance to an offensive component of U.S. foreign policy. NATO warred against a hapless Yugoslavia in Kosovo. An expanded NATO, which includes East European nations, sent forces to Bosnia and Afghanistan but did not replace or augment U.S. troops in Iraq.
NATO’s offensive tactics and far reaching thrusts provoked a challenge from The European Union (EU). Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, drafted a European security strategy that is based on “effective multilateralism” and use of international agencies. Britain, France and Germany have formulated plans to give the European Union a military planning facility that is independent of NATO.
NATO succeeded in preventing a Soviet military action against Western Europe. The same NATO aggressively promoted U.S. policies in the Balkans.
The Balkan Wars – Bosnia and Kosovo
The words Balkan wars create images of armies with long muskets and early 20th century colorful uniforms. Despite two World Wars, the creation of two international peace organizations, and several resolutions that resolved the Balkan borders, the area’s problems continually revived and persisted. The ferocity of the antagonisms, killings, dislocations, and brutalities committed in the Balkans, and the military involvement of the U.S. and NATO in the disputes, indicate that a capitalist/communist hostility, the most accepted reason for previous disputes, and one that had never resulted in military strife in Europe, might have disguised the real reasons for America’s role in the Cold War. Other likely reasons for the Cold War:
the assurance of trade and markets,
the control of a major portion of world resources,
the need to have all nations conform to a unified economic plan,
world hegemony by one party, and
rendering powerless those nations that threaten an emerging New World Order or do not conform to it.
Kosovo Revisited
Although the return of the Kosovar refugees to their towns and villages seemed to prove that the ends justified the means, all the results of the Kosovo war should be considered: testing of weapons in all types of conditions that caused death and destruction, an acceptance that strong nations may attack weaker nations with the pretext of unfair treatment of their minorities, revival of war as a solution to problems, renewal of an arms race, the loss of sovereignty, and the uncomfortable feeling that no matter where you are in the world, if you don’t agree with a specified policy you can become the target of a guided missile.
Because Kosovo contains sites of Serbia’s most sacred churches and monasteries, Serbian nationalism locates Kosovo as the medieval center of a Serbian empire. In 1389, the Serbs lost the land to the Ottoman Turks in a decisive battle fought in Kosovo Polje, the Field of Blackbirds. Serbia was unable to reincorporate Kosovo into its territory until 1912, immediately after the first Balkan wars and Kosovo’s status as an integral part of Serbia wavered between the two world wars. After World War II, the mostly Albanian populated land became officially attached to Yugoslavia.
As far back as 1939, the Yugoslavian parliament addressed its problems in Kosovo: an Albanian minority showed determination to force out the Serb population and to eventually declare independence. Albanian emigration to Kosovo and a high Albanian birthrate slowly shifted the demographics to favor the Albanians. The struggle to achieve independence by a minority that becomes a majority in a province of a nation is not unique. Central government suppression of minority’s rights during civil strife and commission of atrocities on warring sides occur in many regions of the world. Basque Spain, Catholic Northern Ireland, Tamil Sri Lanka, Kurdish Turkey and Chechnya Russia have dominant ethnic minorities and rebellious forces, similar to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), that engage governments and provoke retaliation.
Yugoslavia wasn’t a threat to the United States or any European country. So, why did Yugoslavia and its Kosovo province receive extensive attention? Atrocities against Albanians have been cited as the reason for NATO’s attack, but the civil war in Kosovo and its atrocities were not unique and negotiations were still a viable path to resolution of the internecine warfare. Milosevich agreed to almost all NATO demands except the stationing of troops in sovereign Serbian territory. Possible reasons for the attack on Yugoslavia:
Yugoslavia was allied with Russia and afforded Russia access to the Adriatic Sea,
Yugoslavia’s independent foreign policy did not conform to the emerging New World Order,
Yugoslavia had a socialist oriented economy,
Yugoslavia had the potential to becoming a powerful nation outside of the western orbit.
NATO’s war against Yugoslavia provided a proving ground for new military strategies that used air power and guided missiles.
Washington, February 7, 2000—About five hundred civilians died in ninety separate incidents as a result of NATO bombing in Yugoslavia…–Human Rights Watch. Considering the extent of the strife and mayhem, can U.S. policy in the Balkans be considered a success? The Kosovo war had counter-productive results:
Physical and economic destruction of Yugoslavia: GDP/capita dropped to $2,266 in 2001, and has only risen to $2400 in 2004. Unemployment was at 30% in 2004. (CIA Factbook, 2005).
The Serbs lost authority in Kosovo: Civil authority in Kosovo was transferred to a United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK)
The UN has had to prevent ethnic cleansing of a Serb population that was previously accused of attacking Albanian populations in a civil war and that had been subjected to abuses by Albanian Kosovars for decades. US State Department officials calculated the figure of expelled Serbs at about 100,000( R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Statement before House Committee on International Relations, May 18, 2005.)
Promotion of the concept that strong nations can attack weaker nations that are judged to treat a province unfairly, a prelude to the attack on Iraq.
Revival of nationalism, once cited as a cause of World War II.
Ethnic separation rather then ethnic integration as a guide to national structures, a prelude to the dismemberment of Iraq.
Renewal of U.S. and Russian hostility that continues, as shown in the Ukraine election of December 2004.
Deterioration of the concept of national sovereignty; as noted in Iraq, Sudan and possibly Syria and Iran.
Bosnia Revisited
The Bosniak/Croat leaders realized that any separation from the Yugoslavia Federation would not be approved by the leaders of the Serb population. Former Bosnian president Alija Izetbegovic presented the idealistic view that:
Bosnian unity can be maintained only if Bosnia is organized as a democratic and secular state which stresses the human and political rights of all individuals rather than the rights of national or confessional groups. Only a united Bosnia can be economically viable,
The declaration of independence, in effect, informed the Bosnian Serbs that they would be separated from their fellow Serbs in Yugoslavia and be subservient to a new and unknown Bosnian authority. The Bosniaks and Croats were naive in expecting the Bosnian Serbs, who had major physical, economic and social control of Bosnia, to accept that proposition?
Yugoslavia President Milosevich permitted Slovenia and Macedonia to become independent and did not overpower Croatia after the Catholic province declared its independence. Milosevich made the most serious compromises of all the participants at the Dayton, Ohio meeting and conceeded a narrow strip of territory (see Goradze in the map below) to Bosnia that realized the Dayton accords and established a Bosnia Federation. The Dayton peace agreements, that halted the war, arranged the map of Bosnia in almost the same manner as it had become divided at the initial start of the war. The present Croat/Bosniak Federation covers 51% of the territory and Srpska (Serb Republic) is contained in 49% of the Bosnian nation. During the war, Serbs controlled 70% of the Bosnian Republic.
What has happened to Bosnia and Kosovo?
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzogovina has been divided into a Serbia Republic (Sprska) and a Bosnia Federation that includes Muslim and Croatian regions. The divided nation has a three member presidency that consists of a representative from each major ethnic group, a Muslim, a Croat and a Serb, which rotates every 8 months. Ethnic identity determines voting patterns.
The republics have maintained separate armies. U.S. troops as a part of NATO remained in Bosnia until the end of 2004. On Dec. 2, 2004, a European Union force, consisting of almost the same troops as in NATO, assumed peace-keeping operations. Bosnia’s appearance after drastic wars seems to be constituted worse than a pre-war successful diplomacy would have designed it.
At the end of 2004, the Bosnian republics began to show some cooperation.
More than a million refugees have returned home, even to villages where they are in the minority, dozens of culprits have been sent to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague and a common all-Bosnia defense ministry has been established.
Karel Kovanda, Czech Republic’s UN ambassador , Dec. 16 edition of Mlada fronta Dnes.
The cooperative atmosphere was short lived. Dragan Mikerevic, Bosnian Serb government prime minister resigned on Dec. 17, 2004, in a protest to what he described as unconstitutional interference in his government’s affairs by the country’s Western administrator, Paddy Ashdown. High Representative Ashdown had fired nine Serb officials as punishment for the Bosnian Serb Republic’s failure to arrest war crimes suspects and for Serb rebuke to the establishment of a common all-Bosnia defense ministry. In March 2005, High Representative Paddy Ashdown abruptly dismissed Croat President Dragan Covic after Covic’s indictment for financial corruption, but before his trial took place.
Optimism and spin reconcile Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats living in a single centralized state. The optimism has not been realized.
The political trend in December 2005 has the Serb Republic (Srpska) developing its own characteristics and the Croat population maintaining a separation from the Bosniak population.
Bosnian leaders met in early November 2005 for a three-day meeting in Brussels. On November 14, 2005, they adjourned and failed to reach agreement on a new draft constitution. They met again in Washington D.C. to observe the tenth anniversary of the Dayton peace accords and, at that meeting, gave only a pledge to embark on a process of constitutional reform.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees cites the figure of one million refugees having returned to homes in Bosnia. The one million figure is misleading: (1) Most returnees are elderly who have no other place to locate. (2) Many refugees have returned temporarily to reclaim property and sell homes before moving to a more acceptable location. (3) Jobs are not available.(4) The minority populations that realize they will be discriminated against in employment and education will eventually leave.
What advantage is it to the Serb population to unite with ethnicities with whom they have fought a vicious war? Enemies can live close without renewing violence, but would they want to unite and relive the experiences? Isn’t it more likely Srpska will either remain separate or unite one day with Serbia that has a compatible population? The Dayton Accords contemplated the latter possibilty by constructing Srpska so that it is contiguous, except for the shared Brcko District (see map above).
Serbian President Boris Tadic has indicate dtaht Srpska has a right to join with Serbia if Kosovo becomes an independent state.
Kosovo
The UN (KFOR) still has 18,000 troops in Kosovo. The former Yugoslavia province has its own parliament, prime minister, cabinet, independent police force and judiciary. However, the UN has ultimate authority. On December 12, 2003, the Kosovo parliament voted to invalidate all laws passed during Yugoslavia rule, but the top UN official, Harri Holkeri, who holds the ultimate authority in the disputed province, quickly declared parliament’s move invalid–AP, Dec. 12, 2003.
During the year 2003, three years after the end of hostilities, mayhem existed in Kososvo.
According to statistics collected by the UN criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at The Hague, 1,192 Serbs have been killed, 1,303 kidnapped and 1,305 wounded in Kosovo this year. Though nominally still under UN control, the southern province of Serbia is today dominated by a triumvirate of Albanian paramilitaries, mafiosi and terrorists. They control a host of smuggling operations and are implementing what many observers call their own brutal ethnic cleansing of minority groups, such as Serbs, Roma and Jews.
Isabel Vincent, National Post Wednesday, December 10, 2003, Canada.com
By mid- 2004, almost one-half of the Serbs living in Kosovo had been forced to leave. Serbia’s ethnic presence and Serbian control of Kosovo has been almost eliminated.
Source: Glas Javnosti
On Dec. 3, 2004, Kosovo had a national election
Following the unopposed victory in a Dec. 3, 2004 election in Kosovo, which Serbs boycotted, and the election of the former KLA leader, Ramush Haradinaj, as President, Albanians now expect to declare independence and be recognised by the international community. However, Kosovo is still the legal province of Serbia and guaranteed as such by UN Resolution 1244 of 1999. (One problem) is that the new Kosovo Prime Minister has been indicted in Serbia on 108 counts of war crimes committed by his troops against Serb civilians, as well as other offenses. But he is also facing a possible indictment from the U.N. itself. The U.N.’s war crime tribunal, created in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, has already questioned him as part of an investigation into war crimes.
UN Development Program Agency, December 29, 2004
May 2004, R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in a statement before the House Committee on International Relations:
The economy is a significant challenge for all the people of Kosovo, where unemployment runs at 60 percent or higher. Huge swaths of the economy are outside of formal structures, making them ripe targets for corruption and organized criminal activities. Investment and development are constrained by unreliable basic services that we take for granted, like electricity and telephone systems. Large and inefficient state enterprises are still not privatized and foreign investors are waiting for greater political clarity and decisions on Kosovo’s sovereignty before investing. The UN, after much delay, promulgated rules on eminent domain and land tenure that will allow privatization and other essential economic programs to move forward. With its status unresolved, however, Kosovo is not eligible for the IMF or World Bank assistance that it so urgently needs to develop a stable economy.
The mayhem has lessened. Serbian President Boris Tadic has stated that the negotiations over the future status of Kosovo would start in January 2006. He has mentioned an autonomy that stops short of complete independence for Kosovo, with Kosovo technically a part of Serbia and Serbia controlling foreign policy and armed forces.
Hasim Taci, the President of the Democratic Party of Kosovo says: “We have one solution and this is an independent and sovereign Kosovo.”
In both Bosnia and Kosovo, U.S. policies succeeded in replacing a governing authority with poorly governing authorities, in trading the appearance of repression and incipient “ethnic cleansing” with violence leading to institutionalized “ethnic cleansing” and anarchy, and in complicating problems with war rather than resolving them with negotiation and diplomacy.
European Strife
The new Europe has rejected the treaties and agreements made by allied leaders after two world wars. The new Europe has a united and powerful Germany, a disintegrated Soviet Union, a divided Czechoslovakia and a fragmented Balkans. The United States (a non-European nation) possesses a military and cultural dominance that solicits cooperation from East European European nations but which is becoming less controlling in the Western European nations. It almost seems that Europe has strangely accepted a Nazi vision of Europe: stability enforced by dominance of a single nation and national identity characterized by ethnic identity.
Throughout the post-WWII years, the U.S. maintained good relations with the Western European countries, even with those that had socialist orientation. The United States:
did not confront Portugal when it was governed by the leftist leader Caravalho but tried to destroy the leftist government of the former Portuguese colony of Angola.
was undisturbed when leftist regimes in Greece and Spain replaced former rightist regimes that had championed U.S. policies.
continued friendly relations with Italy despite the fact that the Communists were Italy’s major political party and had several opportunities to achieve power.
resolved its difficulties with DeGaulle, who pursued independent policies that conflicted with U.S. policies.
did not contend Mitterand’s Socialist government that had characteristics which alarmed the U.S. State Department in other areas of the world.
The U.S. acceptance of European regimes that were unacceptable to the U.S. State Department in other regions of the world were because -Americans would not support attacks on Europeans, nor would other Europeans remain silent if any European country became a victim of an attack. A touch of cowardice and bully is also apparent – The U.S. has only attacked small and less industrialized Third World nations. Racism guides U.S. foreign policy.
Although leaders portray friendliness, U.S. relations have deteriorated with the European countries that did not support the attack on Iraq (France, Germany and Russia). American policies, such as not permitting UN control in Iraq and denying contracts in Iraq to those who have not sent troops, have antagonized European allies. The U.S. needed European assistance in its war on terrorism. Instead, American leaders pursued alienating, confrontational and controversial relations with major European countries. Charges that the American CIA violated European Union regulations by using European nations to imprison and interrogate suspected Al-Queda members captured by the U.S. have intensified the anger of European leaders at U.S. policies.
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The Asian Scene
U.S. foreign policy and military adventures in Asia have been counter-productive. Without resolving controversies in its favor, the U.S. temporarily destroyed the Indo-Chinese countries, allowed repressive regimes to flourish in other countries and stimulated what it wanted to prevent: North Korea’s nuclear developments and China’s rapid economic development.
KOREA
Korean War 1948-1952
The United States had no alternative to military intervention in the Korean Civil War. It was obligated to prevent the Korean peninsula from becoming totally controlled by the northern Communists. Although the two Koreas threatened one another and it had become obvious that the stronger North Korea showed itself ready to settle the conflict by military force in 1948, the U.S. had not prepared a constructive Korean policy.
With U.S. troops trapped in a southern area of the Korean peninsula, commanding General Douglas MacArthur landed troops at Inchon and launched a counterattack. Deemed a suicide venture by military experts, and ignored as an impossibility by the North Korean command, the surprise maneuver doomed the North Korean army and ignited an offensive that cleared the South of enemy forces. Instead of calling a truce, U.S. foreign policy drifted into its first great post-war error–a chilling prelude to a future of military catastrophes–U.S. troops continued into North Korea. This excursion generated a military confrontation with China, an additional 20 to 30 thousand American deaths, many more wounded, and hundreds of thousands of Korean casualties.
The military move across the 37th parallel escalated the Cold War and moved China closer to the Soviet Union orbit. After the truce, Korea remained as it had been in 1948, a divided nation. Uncertainty and war has threatened the Korean peninsula for decades. A strategic foothold on the Asian mainland and the economic progress of South Korea have often been described as the successful components of the Korean policy. The losses in American and Korean lives, the human tragedies due to the lack of reunification, and the escalation of East-West tensions offset the immediate successes.
Korea after 1952
The U.S. need for a strategic foothold on the Asian mainland seems unnecessary and redundant. Many South Koreans agree with that position.
A January 2005 poll indicates the South Korean people no longer regard U.S. troop presence as a benefit to their nation. To the question : “Which country is the most threatening to South Korea?” Research & Research, one of South Korea’s largest pollsters, recorded that 39 percent of 800 respondents named the United States. North Korea came in second at 33 percent.
America’s nuclear bases in Japan, in both offensive and defensive positions, are preferable to the bases in South Korea that contain a limited number of troops. South Korea has become a prosperous country and, with each succeeding year, becomes more competitive with the United States, more antagonistic to its benefactor and more allied with China. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomacy has not deterred North Korea from attempting to become a nuclear power or prevented China from becoming the dominant nation in Asia.
South Korea is still America’s 7th largest trading partner, but Uncle Sam now has to contend with a growing trade deficit. For the first nine months of 2005, the U.S. exported $23 billion of goods to South Korea, imported $36 billion of merchamdise from the Asian nation and created a trade deficit of $13 billion.
The Korean war only ended in an armistice, a glorified cease-fire; no peace treaty has been signed and no official termination of hostilities exist. Despite the absence of a formal peace treaty, the peninsula peoples slowly and deliberately cross one another’s borders for humanitarian, cultural and tourist purposes. South Korea is increasing its investments in North Korean ventures. Nevertheless, the U.S. continually challenges a hapless North Korea that might be able to cause havoc if attacked, but has insufficient military power to sustain offensive operations against any nation.
From a REUTERS report, December 30, 2004
SEOUL – North and South Korea have agreed to resume telecommunication services stopped half a century ago as South Korean companies start business at the jointly developed industrial park in the communist state, Seoul said on Thursday. KT Corp., South Korea’s top fixed-line carrier, would offer landline phone calls and facsimile services for local firms operating at the Kaesong industrial park, just across the heavily militarised border, South Korea’s unification ministry said in a statement.
The Kaesong project is the first major joint business venture since the Korean War and South Korean firms are being attracted to the project by cheap labour and land costs. The industrial complex is 10 km (6 miles) north of the heavily fortified border that divides the two Koreas.
Although still split by politics, South and North Korea have built a tourism centre on North Korea’s Mount Kumgang as the showpiece.
S. Korean Tourists Greet New Year at North Korea’s Tourist Spot
MOUNT GEUMGANG, North Korea, Jan. 1, 2005 (Yonhap) — More than 1,000 South Korean tourists greeted the New Year Saturday on Mount Geumgang, one of the most popular tourist attractions in North Korea.
U.S. policy to contain North Korea and alienate that nation from the world’s economic system becomes less successful each year. America’s ambassador to South Korea, Alexander Vershbow has publicly referred to North Korea as a “criminal regime,” which is engaged in money laundering, drug running, counterfeiting and other illicit activities. These remarks could be partly true, in the sense that some renegade North Koreans have been shown to be engaged in illicit activities. They could also apply to Mexico and Israel, and a host of other countries whose nationals have been know to engage in all of these activities. The “hermit kingdom” has shown its disdain for the pronouncement by calling it a “declaration of war.”
Meanwhile, trade between North Korea and South Korea has exhibited an increasing trend. South Korean trade with the North increased by 58 percent in the first three months of 2005 to $170 million compared to the same period last year, according to South Korea’s Unification Ministry. North Korea is also increasing trade with other “friendly” nations. North Korea’s foreign trade increased from $2.9 billion in 2002 to $3.55 billion in 2004; according to KOTRA, a South Korean government organization that monitors North Korean trade.
In retrospect, considering the nature of the North Korea regime, U.S. intervention in the Korean war, that saved South Korea sovereignty, benefited the South Korean people. Nevertheless, it is difficult to know if present-day North Korea is belligerent because it genuinely fears a U.S. attack or is belligerent because it has some aim…for what; what can an aggressive North Korea accomplish? If the U.S. had a better defined and less confrontational policy, it is possible that it would achieve what it claims it wants; a non-threaening North Korea, a nuclear free Korean peninsula and peace and cooperation between the two Koreas.
VIETNAM
Vietnamese War 1961-1975
The greatest foreign policy blunder in U.S. history (until the arming of the Afghanistan Mujaheedin and the occupation of Iraq) brought America 47,382 military dead, 10,811 non-combatant deaths, 153,382 wounded, and 10,173 captured. The American military devastated both North and South Vietnam, inflicted 1 million casualties upon their peoples and brought environmental catastrophes to large areas. Washington claimed counter-insurgency as the U.S role in the war. The insurgents countered the arrival of each American counter-insurgent with an increase in insurgent ranks.
Many arguments can be presented for the escalation of the war. One reason is the failure of the United States to adhere to provisions in the “Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on the Problem of Restoring Peace in Indo-China, July 21, 1954.”
Article 5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy.
Article 7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned. the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Viet-Namese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made, and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission,(8) referred to in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.
The United States established military bases in the Vietnam state (South Vietnam) and refused to allow the Vietnam state to participate in the free elections that were scheduled for July 1956.
Those guiding U.S. foreign policy used exaggerations, such as the skeptical Tonkin Bay attack on U.S. warships by small North Vietnamese speed boats, to justify intervention, and then cited dubious SEATO treaties and an amateurishly created “domino effect” to give legitimacy to intervention.
After years of turmoil and violence in Vietnam and at home, the U.S. realized its policy of a government “without elections” in Vietnam. The North took control of all of Vietnam without any election. This result might have been a blessing for a U.S. administration that had no cognizance of how a demoralized, ill equipped, corrupt and poorly led South Vietnam could govern Vietnam without leaning on U.S. military presence for a long period of time.
Vietnam after 1975
After its battles with China and Cambodia (both of which were accused by the U.S. administration as being partners with North Vietnam in the Vietnam War), the united Vietnam is a peaceful country and doesn’t threaten neighbors. It is slowly becoming part of the international investment community, the position that the U.S. envisioned for a united Vietnam when it sent its forces to wage battle in the deltas and jungles of a relatively primitive country.
The United States and Vietnam signed a bilateral trade agreement in 2001 and three years later, the first U.S. scheduled flight since the war ended in 1975, a United Airlines’ Boeing 747-400 carrying more than 300 passengers, landed at Tan Son Nhat international airport in Ho Chi Minh City . Foreign investors poured US $4.2 billion into projects in Vietnam in 2004. U.S. exports to Vietnam reached $1.2 billion in 2004 and total bilateral trade was almost $6.5 billion. The United States is Vietnam’s largest overseas market and purchases one-fifth of all Vietnamese exports.
What happened to the “domino theory,” a theory proposed by U.S. Asian experts, who said if the communists won the war then all of Southeast Asia would come under communist domination?
CAMBODIA
Cambodia 1968-1978
The destruction in Cambodia started before the end of the Vietnam campaign. The U.S. challenged the North Vietnamese military’s use of a neutral territory for bringing troops and material to the South, and the U.S. carried the war into Cambodia with extensive bombings and military excursions. This “secret” war was the first time after WWII that the U.S. attacked a sovereign country in an undeclared war. The action set a precedent for future attacks.
After realizing they could not convince Cambodia’s ruler, Prince Sihanouk, to take action against the North Vietnamese use of Cambodian jungle paths to bring soldiers and material to the Viet Cong, the CIA engineered Sihanouk’s overthrow. The years following this action are one of the saddest of any country’s history. Sihanouk, who brought a measure of stability and prosperity to his country during a wartime crisis, wanted to remain neutral. His disposal, exile and replacement by General Lon Nol , who quickly assumed dictator powers, brought violence and civil war to the country. The ultra- radical Khmer Rouge captured the leadership and brought the country to administrative and economic ruin. After the end of the Vietnam war, the united Socialist Republic of Vietnam invaded the country, ostensibly to create order. The war escalated to further civil wars and extended the killings and destruction that started with the U.S. policy of replacing Sihanouk.
Cambodia after 1978
The Khmer Rouge has been defeated. Sihanouk has died. Vietnam forces have vacated the country. Cambodia has an elected government and intermittent social stability. Human Rights groups accuse Prime Minister Hun Sen of jailing dissidents. Hun Sen’s political Party has control of the military, and Cambodia’s institutions seem to be weak and politicized.
America’s position in the world has not been changed by Cambodia’s flip-flop of governments. Cambodian life has been tragically punished due to a careless American policy.
CHINA
Containment guided the United States’ policy towards China. Successive American administrations designed their policies to prevent China from developing into a world economic and military power that could challenge U.S. hegemony. The U.S. attitude towards China has grown from intense hostility without violent intent to a “constructive engagement,” that cajoles, insults, accuses and tries everything to get China to do…what? Nobody is sure, and regardless of what the government states or implies, China has done what it wants–border wars with Vietnam and India, incorporating Tibet, controlling its people in a manner in which it feels they should be controlled. Meanwhile China grows economically and militarily more powerful each day. And each day the U.S. perceives China as an increasing threat. The containment of China has raised fears of an eventual conflict that will use the mightiest weapons to achieve victory.
The U.S. concerns with a war on terrorism, establishment of a viable Afghan government and its occupation of Iraq, defused its aggressive stance with China. The Asian dynamo’s positive entrance into the world economy and its possibilities for U.S. investment and trade mellowed the “China bashers.” America’s diplomacy with China jelled into a more mutual arrangement; an accidental result of U.S. intensive attention to Middle East problems. In this mutual cooperation, China has assisted the U.S. attempts to resolve its dispute with North Korea, and the U.S. has assisted China in dampening its dispute with Taiwan. The friendly stance has been buffeted by an ill wind – planned joint manuevers of Chinese and Russian military forces, which were held held on Chinese territory,.
The military exercises were large scale and comprehensive, including army, navy, air force and submarine units, and possibly strategic bombers. The war games are a further step in the “strategic partnership” between Moscow and Beijing, which began after Washington and the European Union imposed arms embargoes on Beijing in the aftermath of the suppression in 1989 of the Chinese pro-democracy movement. Since then, China has become the major purchaser of Russian armaments, including fighter aircraft, missiles, submarines and naval destroyers. The joint exercises indicate Moscow’s and Beijing’s common interest in countering Washington’s unilateral strategy.
China has taken a leading role in the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), while advancing another association of East Asian nations. By establishing Free Trade areas for its members, these associations make it more difficult for U.S. exports to the Pacific area. Statistics indicate that the U.S. 2005 trade deficit with China will be $200 billion dollars.
U.S. foreign policy with China follows a familiar pattern of an aggressive stance, supporting Taiwan, constantly accusing China of violation of human rights and lack of democracy. China yawns, the world doesn’t care and U.S. policies slowly sink…the U.S.
MYANMAR (Union of Burma)
The United States showed moral courage in attempting to either modify or overthrow an illegitimate military government in Myanmar. Nevertheless, moral imperatives don’t move nations, and an amateurly directed U.S. policy towards Myanmar has harmed Burma’s people and not brought freedom and democracy to Myanmar.
After Myanmar’s ruling junta refused to recognize the 1990 overwhelming legislative election victory by the National League for Democracy (NLD), and placed NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest, the U.S. Congress passed the Customs and Trade Act, which enabled the president to impose new sanctions against Myanmar. On May 20, 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13047, which took effect on May 21, banning most new U.S. investment in “economic development of resources in Myanmar .” To justify the ban, the president cited a “constant and continuing pattern of severe repression” of the democratic opposition by Burma’s ruling junta. In 2003, the U.S. government banned imports from Myanmar. What were the results of U.S. actions against Myanmar?
Due to continuous sanctions against Myanmar and import restrictions of its goods to the U.S., the Myanmar garment industry closed more than 200 of its 400 factories, wages dropped and many workers were either unemployed or forced to take jobs in Thailand until the garment industry recovered. Asian nations, especially China, India and South Korea, the usual suspects, filled the vacuum created by American sanctions. China is investing in Myanmar mining and light industry. India is importing natural gas and proposes to construct a pipeleine from Myanmar to India. South Korea’s Daewoo International has invested heavily in gas development projects. The previous $470 million/yr garment exports to the United States has been shifted to orders from Korean and Taiwan merchandisers who then sell the merchandise in Europe.
The CATO INSTITUTE has summarized the failure of U.S. sanctions against Myanmar (Burma).
U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA , A Failure on All Fronts , by Leon T. Hadar
Present U.S. policy toward Burma is not going to bring meaningful change in the human rights practices of the regime and will probably make the bad situation in Burma even worse. Sanctions strengthen the hand of the ruling authorities by creating a scapegoat for their own internal policy failures and narrowing the opportunity of private individuals in Burma to expand their economic, social, and cultural contacts with the citizens of the West.
OTHER ASIA
Economic and military interests have dictated U.S. policy towards other Asiatic countries. The U.S. has contributed to the creation of economic powerhouses in Japan and Taiwan in order to have stable and friendly governments that allow the U.S. to maintain military bases. Other countries have not been as fortunate. Indonesia and the Philippines had their years of prosperity turn into near economic collapse, but have recovered. These countries maintained totalitarian and corrupt governments for decades and U.S. support to them generated insurrections, retaliations and violent confrontations. Although still subject to terrorism, Indonesia and the Philippines have started to evolve more stable institutions.
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The Middle-East
The post WWII policies liberated the Arab countries from foreign domination and enabled their governments to exercise greater control of oil resources. The United States had superior finances and technology for assisting the oil producers and became the favored partner. As energy became the most significant resource to the fast growing Western world, U.S. policy in the Middle East retreated to three words–get the oil. Several powerful oil producing nations remain antagonistic to the United States and the U.S. policy towards the Arab world has been one cause of terrorism. The hypocritical policy has created havoc for some of the area’s nations. Lacking any apparent change, it portends a dangerous future.
IRAN
In 1946, the Soviet Union occupied parts of Northern Iran that had previously been attached to the Soviet Union. Truman demanded a Soviet retreat and succeeded in having the Russian troops removed. This overlooked event signified a basis for cooperation with the Soviet Union. The U.S. government ignored the Soviet acquiescence and headed into the Cold War. The next major Iranian event occurred in 1954 when Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh threatened to nationalize the oil industry. He was forced to resign and soon the U.S. found its colleague, the anti-Communist Shah Pahlevi, firmly in power. The State Department failed to realize that the Shah considered Iran his personal fiefdom and that the uneven economic progress he brought to Iran did not have the support of the masses, especially those inclined to a more rigid Islam. This lack of foresight proved fatal to the Shah and American interests in Iran.
In 1979, the Iranians deposed the Shah and an Islamic movement, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, gained control. Instead of using diplomacy with the new government and demonstrating restraint, U.S. policy reflected its bias against a regime that did not follow its dictates. Despite Iran’s protests, the Carter government, with advice from the ubiquitous Henry Kissinger, allowed the Shah to enter the U.S. for medical treatment. This event provoked Iranian extremists to seize the American embassy and hold U.S. citizens as prisoners. The Shah eventually returned to Panama and died in Egypt. Relations with Iran rapidly declined to a total separation. The U.S. quickly lost any economic and strategic advantages it had established in Iran.
U.S. policy planners could not admit mistakes and their policy towards Iran continued on a destructive path. In Iraq’s war against Iran, the U.S. provided arms and support to Saddam Hussein. During the war, Iran and Iraq attempted to prevent external trading by one another and.attacked oil tankers and merchant ships in the Persian Gulf. After Iraq bombed Iran’s main oil exporting facility on Khark Island, Iran attacked a Kuwaiti tanker near Bahrain on May 13, 1984, and a Saudi tanker in Saudi waters on May 16.
Kuwait, in 1986, formally petitioned foreign powers to protect its shipping, and the U.S. responded in 1987. The U.S. Navy moved warships into the Persian Gulf to guard the Straits of Hormuz, a narrow waterway between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and to protect tanker shipping against possible Iranian aggression. In one aggression in the Persian Gulf, on May 17, 1987, the Iraqi air force bombed the USS Stark, killing 37 and injuring 21 Americans. The U.S. excused the aggression as a mistake.
The Iran/Iraq war, encouraged by U.S. military support to Iraq, caused massive destruction to both countries and to their Kurdish citizens. In a coda to the macabre concerto, on July 3, 1988, the U.S. cruiser Vincennes shot down an Iranian commercial Airbus in Iranian waters, after supposedly mistaking it for an Iranian F-14. Two hundred and ninety civilian passengers, included 66 children, were killed.
After these catastrophes, the U.S. tried to establish friendly relations with Iran and wondered why the Iranians were obstinate.
One major result of the bitter antagonism between the U.S. and Iran has been suspicion of Iranian involvement in terrorist attacks against U.S. military personnel. Although lacking definite proof, Iran has been accused of assisting the incipient Lebanese Hezbelloh in the 1983 bombing of the Beirut marine barracks in which 241 U.S. military personnel were killed, and involvement in the June 1996 bombing of a U.S. military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which claimed the lives of 19 U.S. servicemen. Two more recent events have impeded any rapproachement between the United States and Iran. The American occupation of Iraq has strengthened the Shiite majority in that country and made the U.S. suspicious that Iran will influence its co-religionists to favor Iranian policies. U.S. antagonism, pushed by Israel’s fear of Iran, has provoked Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. Words lead to more bitter words and not any positive action. Iran’s relations with America are as strained as the first day that the U.S. assisted the Shah after his downfall. Since America might not be able extend its military engagements beyond Iraq, Israel has shown intentions to halt Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. has become attached to Israel’s policies and cannot achieve an agreement with Iran without compromising Israel’s objectives.
The U.S. government can try to invoke its “democracy” message of rescuing the Iranian people from tyranny and leading it into being a democracy. However, in what was considered a democratic election, (but not democratic procedure since not all political persuasions could pursue office) the Iranian people elected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the hardline mayor of Tehran, to becoming Iranian president with 61.69% of the vote in the second voting round. Turnout was estimated at almost 60% of eligible voters. Evidently, even a new democratic government in Iran won’t easily change Iran’s positions.
In retrospect, the United States has no irreconcilable issues with Iran that cannot be resolved by diplomacy. Iran directly supports those it considers being oppressed by Israel and is definitely opposed to the Israeli state. However, arguments that Iran supports international terrorism have never been adequately proved. Iran has no special reason to harm the United States and no capability to do harm without itself being demolished. The Islamic state has no territorial ambitions and can’t spread its religious doctrines because of the limitationsof Shiism in the Moslem world. Actually, Iran has often allied itself with U.S. interests by vigorously opposing the enemies of the United States. Iran has contested Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Afghanistan’s Taliban, Soviet Union’s communism and Osama bin Laden’s Al Queda. Decades of antagonism between the United States and The Islamic Republic have only reinforced the antagonisms and have propelled the two nations to a collision course. In 1954, the United States assisted in replacing Iran’s constitutional government with an autocratic government. In 2006, the U.S. is seeking to replace Iran’s autocratic government with a constitutional government – another example of counterproductive U.S. foreign policies.
IRAQ
U.S. policy towards Saddam Hussein’s secular Iraq has been the reverse of its policy towards clerical Iran. The U.S. supported Iraq in the 1980′s, but Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait changed America’s attitude. Within one month after the start of the war, U.S. led forces in the Persian Gulf war destroyed Iraq’s military and eventually Iraq’s economy. U.S. policy built up an intended friend, determined the intended friend was actually an enemy nation, and then saved the enemy nation by destroying it.
Accurate Iraqi casualty figures in the Gulf War, killed and wounded, have been difficult to verify. Estimates range from tens of thousands to 300,000. The PBS program Frontline broadcast its acceptance of the following figures:
According to “Gulf War Air Power Survey” by Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, (a report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force; 1993-ISBN 0-16-041950-6), there were an estimated 10-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war. This analysis is based on enemy prisoner of war reports. The Iraqi government says 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/appendix/death.html
Did all of this have to happen? By being cordial to Saddam Hussein for many years, the United States reinforced the Iraqi leader’s power. State department dispatches indicate that Ambassador Glaspie gave Iraq a “green” light to invade Kuwait, or at least did not apply sufficient pressure to prevent the invasion.
Iraq had legitimate complaints: Kuwait had siphoned oil from the shifting sands of Iraqi territory: Kuwait owed a prostate Iraq some remuneration after having defended Kuwait against a possible Iran incursion: Kuwait walked out of discussions on the complaints and totally rebuffed Iraq. The United States could have arbitrated these complaints or forced the parties to comply with its directives. The U.S. policy makers had options. They chose to be complacent and indirectly paved the path to a punishing war.
The post-war policy continued a ferocious pattern, and U.S. and British planes bombed Iraq for the next twelve years. The bombings destroyed more “command and control” facilities and “radar bases” than Iraq could possibly have had. This senseless and vicious policy transformed Iraq from an emerging country with moderate prosperity into an impoverished country with a starving population. Statistics from a “UN Report on the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, Mar. 1999:”
Maternal mortality rate increased from 50/100,000 live births in 1989 to 117/100,000 in 1997.
Low birth weight babies (less than 2.5 kg) rose from 4% in 1990 to about 25% of registered births in 1997, due mainly to maternal malnutrition.
Calorie intake fell from 3,120 to 1,093 calories per capita/per day by 1994-95.
Malnutrition in Iraqi children under five increased from 12% to 23% from 1991-96.
The World Food Program estimated that access to potable water in 1998 was 50% of the 1990 level in urban areas and only 33% in rural areas.
Consider the total population affected by the macabre figures and it is possible that one million Iraqis had their lives shortened by the punishing embargoes and bombing. Future generations will inherit the suffering. What were the purposes of this unstated U.S. policy?
The U.S. continually attempted to overthrow Saddam Hussein and continually failed. Rebellions by the Shiites and Kurds were encouraged and these rebellions reinforced Saddam’s retribution and will. The U.S. claimed to protect the rebellious Kurd and Shiite minorities but allowed Turkey to attack the Kurds and didn’t prevent Oman, a Persian Gulf sultanate, from terrorizing its Shiite minority.
The reasons for the U.S. policy towards Iraqi have been ambiguous. If the results follow policy, then the results indicate the unstated policy was the opposite of what was believed. The U.S. did not want a new Iraqi government. It wanted a continually unstable, embattled, embargoed and disrupted Iraq. Why? To maintain impotent a potentially strong Middle East country that could contend U.S. policy and arouse others in the region to challenge U.S. major partners.
After Iraq recovered from war and sanctions and entered a path to stability and progress, the combined U.S. and British invasion in 2003 destroyed additional physical plant and interrupted Iraq’s return to normalcy. Post-war developments have continued the destruction with losses of basic services, widespread looting and crime and inept reconstruction efforts to rebuild infrastructure. The “we had to destroy them in order to save them policy” has brought internal conflicts, sabotage, and aggressive reactions.
The defeat of Saddam Hussein’s regime and his capture happened too late. It occurred after an Iranian war, a Gulf war, Iraqi civil wars, sanctions and a joint American and British war against Iraq. The damage had been done. A failed policy did not prevent the damage. War, which is the last resort of inept diplomacy to resolve a problem, cannot undo the damage. The dramatization of the capture of a powerless Saddam Hussein, shriveled up in a dirt hole cannot disguise the facts that he was powerless before the invasion and already in a self-made hole. The United States has not been able to convince the world that the invasion did more than only displace Saddam Hussein and transfer his location.
The principal arguments for the invasion–finding and destroying weapons of mass destruction and being essential for the war on terrorism– have been proven false. U.S. weapons of massive destruction have been used to learn that no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction exist. The war has not diminished terrorism–just the opposite–the battlefield has been changed and enlarged. Radical Islamists, who might have stayed home, found a cause and have entered Iraq. Nevertheless, the percentage of foreign insurgents in the entire insurgency is small. U.S. troops are mainly fighting a home-grown Iraq insurgency that has no visible end.
The attempt to establish a regime in Iraq that is partial to American interests threatens the economic life, cultural awareness and social identity of Iraq. This miscalculation may generate adverse reactions throughout the Middle East and provoke other Middle-East conflagrations. In Vietnam, America’s departure did not leave a political vacuum–the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in North Vietnam had an established government and extended its authority. The retreat of American forces from Vietnam did not unleash internecine warfare–a repressive authority together with an allied National Liberation Front stifled opposition. A U.S. departure from Iraq will leave an untested government and might stir unresolved antagonisms into conflict. By invading and occupying Iraq, the Bush administration:
Shifted resources from a legitimate war on terrorism to a wasted war on a sovereign country.
Shifted a battle against Al Queda to a wider battlefield against expanded opponents.
Inherited the ethnic problems that faced all Iraqi rulers.
Alienated itself from much of the world community.
Made all wars legal by its doctrine of pre-emptive strike.
Polarized American citizens,
Created economic, military and social quagmires from which America might not escape.
Caused the death of about 30,000 Iraqi civilians (George W. Bush estimate, Dec. 2005)
Started a war that has brought death to 2,016 and combat-related injuries to16,601 U.S. troops (Associated press, Dec. 15, 2005).
December 2005 pronouncements from President George W. Bush shifted the priorities and reasons for the war:
Although Iraq had no WMD’s the war is bringing democracy and stability to the Middle East. Unsaid is that Iraq might not be ready for democracy and there is no evidence of any increased political stability in the Middle East.
Progress is shown by the drafting of a preliminary constitution and by the parliamentary elections. The U.S. is selective in defining progress. Iran has had elections and they aren’t making progress.
The United States is winning the war.
The U.S, is not fighting a war. An insurgency is fighting occupation. U.S. has a defensive role. By fighting terrorists in Iraq, the U.S. does not have to fight them at home. These ” terrrorists” are a small part of the Iraq insurgency and have been manufactured by the occupation of Iraq. It’s interesting that President Bush has permitted more than 2000 American soldiers to be killed (almost as many as happened in 9/11) and more than 16,000 to be wounded (much more than happened in 9/11) in Iraq, to “protect” them from being killed or wounded in the U.S. He doesn’t mention the more than 30,000 Iraqis killed during the battles that protect American citizens. In other words, Iraqis have to be sacrificed so Americans are “protected,” even if Bush can’t prove that Americans are being protected.
One of the more serious consequence of U.S. policy in Iraq is the development of an American psyche that disregards the falsehoods that governed the attack on Iraq and accepts the concept of pre-emptive strike together with battlefield casualties. The U.S. government can originate any reason to attack other countries, suffer losses and not be constrained by public opinion. It is too early to know if we are witnessing the rebirth of an Iraqi people or the final whisper of an Iraqi civilization.
ISRAEL/PALESTINE
U.S. Middle East policy is driven, rather than guided, by the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Although the U.S. has the military and economic power and opportunities to force an acceptable solution to the strife, its wandering and contradictory policies have not prevented the violence.
The contradictions include acting as a sole arbitrator for bringing peace and then vetoing dozens of UN resolutions that criticized Israel and which, if implemented, might have compelled Israel to end the conflict. After decades of conflicts and debates, the conflict and debate continue. Since Israel’s military strength is infinite times that of the Palestinians, the U.S. could serve to equalize the strengths. The U.S. insists the two parties compromise their differences, while knowing that a dominant Israel will not make concessions to a fragile Palestine. Each day Israel becomes stronger and the Palestinians become weaker.
The U.S. policy has strengthened Israel and weakened the Palestinians. The future is ominous. Israel’s construction of a barrier wall, supposedly to prevent infiltration of suicide bombers into Israel, doesn’t prevent Israeli F-15 bombers from entering Palestinian territory. The barrier’s encroachment into Palestinian lands and its encirclement of Palestinian communities and major cities will bring the entire West Bank under Israeli control and decimate Palestinian life. (for a report go to: Israel Separation Barrier )
In effect, since President Jimmy Carter in 1979 negotiated the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai and the estalishment of relations between Egypt and Israel, U.S wandering policies have only allowed Israel to expand its territory and occupation, and have served to bring the Palestinian community closer to total destruction.
The hope that the demise of Yasser Arafat would bring agreement between Israel and a new Palestinian Authority (PA) is fading quickly. It is apparent that Israel wants surrender and is dictating the surrender terms to the PA. The fundamental issues remain:
Israeli settlements in the West Bank
Israel’s denial of compensation to Palestinian refugeees.
Israel’s desire of total control of Jerusalem.
Lack of resolution of the fundamental issues have created more difficult issues:
Terrorism against Israel by Palestinian extremists.
Construction of a separation wall that will strangle Palestinian economic and social life.
The United States has described Hamas as a terrorist organization, although Hamas is mostly a well organized, humanitarian and graft free organization that has helped the Palestinian people. Only its military wing, which considers itself in a legitimate battle against occupiers has participated in terrorist actions. Counter-productive U.S. policies, such as demanding the Palestinian Authority to halt all terrorism before Israel halts and retreats from settlements, an impossible task for Abu Mazen, have driven the Palestinian people to elect the Hamas Authority to a majority in the Palestinain parliament. The U.S. has helped to achieve the opposite of what its wanted. It almost seems that the U.S. does not want a just solution to the problem; it only wants Israel to control the entire area, regardless of the injustices to the Palestinians.
The continuing conflict and U.S. impartiality to Israel is cited as a principal reason for Arab and Muslim hostility to the United States. It is also one of the reasons for terrorism against the United States. The Israel/Palestinian war affects the military thoughts of many countries. It could lead to a nuclear war.
LEBANON
Once, the most prosperous, most beautiful and most hospitable of all of the Middle East countries, Lebanon has been disrupted by its indirect relationship to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. U.S. involvement in Lebanon’s affairs never had positive results. In the Eisenhower administration, during a short period of political uncertainty, U.S. marines landed on the Lebanese beaches. They stayed and they left. It was never clear why they had arrived. During the latter stages of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1980′s, the U.S. together with other European countries dispatched warships and marines to Lebanon. Although the U.S. claimed it had entered a sovereign country to protect it, U.S. warships responded to spurious attacks on U.S. marines by shelling the Lebanese mountains and killing scores of people. A Lebanese group retaliated by blowing up the marine barracks and killing more than 200 marines. U.S. policy in Lebanon left many killed on both sides. It helped save Arafat’s PLO and enabled him and his organization to move to Tunisia.
Lebanon is probably the most anti-Israel country in the world and, despite U.S. protests, Syria maintained until 2006 a strong presence in Lebanon. U.S. specification of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization has only complicated the situation and strenthened Hezbollah’s representation in the Lebanese parliament. Hezbollah holds a 12-seat coalition in Lebanon’s 128-member parliament under the Resistance Bloc banner. Hezbollah-funded schools and hospitals serve thousands of mostly poor residents in southern Lebanon, who favor the party because of its success in forcing Israel to end the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. The party’s well-equipped private army has a significant arsenal that includes guns, rockets and a new drone spy plane and sufficient authority to operate largely as an independent government in southern Lebanon. A once peaceful Lebanon is now a constant powder keg.
AFGHANISTAN
U.S. policies that countered Soviet Union influence in Afghanistan, which included the massive entry of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, will go down in history as the greatest blunder of American foreign policies. The policies exhibited a common feature of U.S. foreign policy: arming eventual enemies to combat perceived antagonists.
Although Afghanistan was never considered a part of the Cold war conflict, being that it was outside the U.S. sphere of influence and bordered the Soviet Union, American President Ronald Reagan provided assistance to the Mujaheedin in Afghanistan. The Mujaheedin eventually succeeded in forcing out Soviet troops, but enabled Radical Islam to flourish and Osama Bin Laden to establish terrorist training camps. The result of U.S. policies in Afghanistan: The greatest terrorist attack on U.S. soil with a loss of approximately 3000 lives.
The Soviet Union intervention in the internal conflicts of Afghanistan may have been improper but it did not include economic exploitation or permanent seizure of territory. It had benefits for the United States that the Reagan administration failed to recognize: Radical Islam was suppressed and poppy production was not permitted. The Soviet Union supplied forces from 1980-1986 to assist Babrak Kamal’s Afghan regime to contain internal political frictions, prevent a Civil War from creating anarchy that could undo the economic progress of previous governments, and maintain the status quo in East-West spheres of influence. The Afghan internal politics, the Civil War and the Soviet Union intervention did not directly affect U.S. world hegemony or the Cold War balance of power. The Mujaheedin, whom the U.S. provided arms, material and finances through Pakistan, consisted of a radical Islam that had already shown itself to be hostile to American interests.
The Soviets retreated from Afghanistan in Feb. 1989, and the United States had an opportunity to let the war play out among Afghans. Continued U.S. arms shipments through Pakistan to the Mujaheedin forced the 1992 demise of the Najibullah government, which tried to carry out democratic reforms by creating a coalition government of reconciliation. A reactionary Islamic Taliban gained control of Afghanistan after the civil war caused more than 50,000 additional deaths. The Mujaheedin, characterized as freedom fighters and brought to fighting capability by U.S. arms, destroyed Afghanistan, caused an immense number of deaths, could not compromise among themselves to form a stable government, and became responsible for the Taliban emergence and its control of Afghanistan. The Taliban permitted terrorist groups to train on its territory. These terrorists have brought death to Americans and destruction to U.S. facilities. The most prominent vestige of U.S. intervention in the Afghanistan Civil War is Ibn Bin Laden.
The American administration reacted to the the 9/11 terrorist on its territory with appropriate attacks against terrorist bases in Afghanistan and with an overthrow and scattering of the Taliban regime. The battles have not ended and some of the same conditions that promoted the Afghanistan war exist–tribal rivalries, warlords, religious fundamentalism and poppy growing as a principal economic contribution. In effect, the U.S. replaced the Soviet Union in the war in Afghanistan.
In 2004, political trends were positive. Provincial warlords had been severely reduced in power and Taliban supporters were composed of loosely connected insurgents rather than a major fighting force. On December 7, 2004, Afghanistan elected Hamid Karzai was inaugurated as its first president. Karzai’s government initiated a plan that allowed low-ranking Taliban forces to be granted amnesty from prosecution in exchange for surrender of their arms to US troops. Many accepted the deal. More recently, President Karzai extended amnesty to top Taliban leader’s, including 2nd in command Mullah Mohammad Omar. The Mullah refused the offer.
If a sufficient number of Taliban followers accepted the amnesty offer, the withdrawal of the US’s 18,000 Afghanistan-based troops would have begun in June 2005. This has not happened. U.S.personnel, in a Jan. 4, 2006 interview, said “the insurgency grew stronger in 2005. It has become better organized with better-trained fighters and more advanced weaponry.” NATO foreign ministers approved plans to send up to 6,000 soldiers, mostly European and Canadian, into volatile southern Afghanistan.
As the New Year of 2006 rolled in, trends were not positive. In economics, the major Afghan income is still due to about 4,600 tons of opium (320,000 tons of heroin) and 70 drug laboratories in southern Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan that process opium into heroin. The ominous political and military trends are not well reported. From the British newspaper, The Scotsman, Jan. 13:
Foreign fighters flood into Afghanistan by TIM RIPLEY:
HUNDREDS of foreign Islamic fighters are gathering in Afghanistan ahead of the deployment of 4,000 British troops to the country in the spring. British intelligence sources have told The Scotsman Islamic radicals sympathetic to al-Qaeda see Afghanistan as their new frontline and are starting to shift the focus of their anti-western campaign from Iraq.
The fighters, including Jordanians, Yemenis, Egyptians and Gulf Arabs, stepped up their campaign two months ago with a series of suicide bombings against NATO peacekeepers, United States troops and Afghan government leaders. “Attacks in Afghanistan are now running at more than 500 a month – it’s getting as dangerous for westerners as Iraq in some places,” said a British officer involved in planning the NATO peacekeeping mission in the south-west of the country.
January 2006 news reports are verifying the Scotsman report. Suicide bombings are on the rise. Two January 16, 2006 headlines:
AFGHAN ATTACK KILLS CANADIAN DIPLOMAT
AT LEAST 20 KILLED IN SUICIDE BOMBING IN AFGHANISTAN
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African Scene
The African countries don’t possess economic and military muscle and, for those reasons, the U.S. has generally treated central African countries with benign neglect. In some countries, notably Egypt, South Africa and Zimbabwe, U.S. policy has been mildly constructive.
Egypt has received U.S. financial and military assistance without compromising its national integrity. The assistance occurred after the U.S. refused to support the construction of the Aswan dam, an economic benefit to Egypt that the Soviet Union financed.
The South African policy, that included embargo of many goods, assisted in the termination of Apartheid and a government of reconciliation. In Zimbabwe, the United States did not contend the evolution of the former white led Rhodesia to a majority black led Zimbabwe. The political frameworks of the latter countries, where Nelson Mandela, an ardent communist, became the president of South Africa, and where Mugabe formed a leftist government in Zimbabwe, demonstrate that the U.S. could cooperate with leftist leaders and their government would not imperil U.S. interests. U.S. policies towards the African countries have not assisted them in alleviating their continual poverty, internal wars and economic catastrophes.
REPUBLIC of CONGO
The Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, and previously the Republic of Congo, is an example of the complete cycle of a U.S. policy that ends in desolation.
In 1959, popular revolts and demands for independence from Belgium forced the Belgian government to negotiate with rebellious parties. During elections in 1960, the Congolese National Movement (MNC), directed by Patrice Lumumba, became the country’s strongest party. Lumumba, already recognized as one of Africa’s most vociferous leaders of anti-colonial liberation movements, became Prime Minister of the Congo Republic immediately before the country’s independence on June 30, 1960. He had a difficult task and could not control the many factions that desired the Congo’s resources and riches. His socialist leanings and avowed non-alignment policies prevented him from acquiring the U.S. as an ally. Within one month, Katanga, the Congo’s richest province, with the assistance of the major powers, seceded. On September 14, Colonel Mobutu Sese Seko effectively neutralized the Congo’s institutions and its leaders. The military placed Lumumba under house arrest and protection by the United Nations. After several transfers of his confinement, Patrice Lumumba, and two his comrades were killed on January 17, 1961. The official reason for his death–accidentally shot while attempting to escape.
The complicity of the United States and the CIA in this unfortunate episode has not been definitely proved. Many informed persons take it for granted that the CIA played a leading role in Lumumba’s demise. In any case, the United States motivated the anti-Lumumba activities by demonstrating its disapproval of Lumumba and by not giving him adequate protection. U.S. total support for Mobutu, who seized power of the Congo in 1965 and reigned for 32 years, hints at U.S. involvement in the Congo’s affairs. After changing the country name to Zaire, Mobutu ruled as a despot. In 1980, he banned all political parties, except his own. Although he created unity among the country’s 200 ethnic groups and nationalized the mining industries, he personally controlled 70% of the country’s wealth, valued at 5 billion dollars. At his death in 1997, he was personally responsible for 80% of Congo debts.
Laurent-Denise Kabila, originally an avowed communist and with a vision similar to Lumumba, forced a dissipated Mobutu from power in early 1997. A physically weakened Kabila inherited a country in ruins that soon found itself in a brutal civil war with insurgents backed by Rwanda and Uganda governments. Kabila was assassinated on 16 January 2001, and his son became head of state. Almost two years later, in December 2002, Joseph Kabila succeeded in obtaining a “peace” agreement between all remaining warring parties, and was able to set up a government of national unity. After 35 years of U.S. involvement in sharing its prosperous affairs and little involvement in relieving its pains, the resource rich Congo, the most promising of the liberated central African countries, is an economic, political and social bankrupt nation.
Twenty-four million citizens have registered to vote in the first nation-wide elections to be held in more than forty years. The electoral process began with approval by referendum of a new constitution on December 18 and 19, 2005. The election of legitimate leaders is scheduled for June, 2006.
However, the DRC has intermittent pockets of conflict. Government soldiers, who were sent to reinforce the eastern part of the nation, have clashed with former Rwandan-backed rebels. Added to the threat of renewed war is the displacement of people from the Goma war, estimated recently by Jan Egeland, U.N. Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs, at 2.5 million, and also the affects on the population of war related diseases and malnutrition. According to the International Rescue Committee, and reported by the Voice of America on Dec. 9, 2004, more than 1,000 Congolese civilians are dying each day from illness and poor diet. Reports continue into 2006, that the Congo still has a severe humanitarian crisis, with 38,000 people dying each month . The government dismisses the reports and terms them as “a big lie,” whose “figures are very exaggerated.”
Angola
Angola became a victim of the Cold War immediately after it achieved independence from Portugal. All of its insurgent groups, identified by acronyms such as MPLA, FLNA and UNITA had alliances with anti-American left wing international organizations. The MPLA had close ties to Moscow and received military training from Cuban forces. UNITA leader, Jonas Savimba, a late entry to the insurgency, considered himself a Maoist and was prepared to organize the country in accord with Mao’s principles. Roberto Holden, an avowed Marxist, commanded the FLNA. After a group of disillusioned military officers led by General Antonio de Spinola, overthrew the Lisbon government and granted independence to Angola on July 14, 1974, the three groups formed a short lived coalition. The alliance broke down, and the MPLA, which emerged as the most powerful group, obtained the government positions of the departing Portuguese. With Agostinho Neto as head of state, the MPLA extended political control over much of the country. The FLNA and UNITA joined forces to combat the MPLA. The U.S. role in the Angola civil war became obvious–spoil MPLA’s nation building plan.
Initially, the U.S. supported the Marxist FLNA. As the MPLA became stronger, the U.S. also funded the Maoist UNITA. The State department ignored MPLA’s business alliances with U.S. oil companies, and its attempts to secure friendly relations with many Western countries and invites to foreign investment. Rather than encourage investment and improve relations, the State department pressured the oil companies to cease operations in Cabinda, Angola’s oil producing region. Neto died in 1979 and Jose Eduardo Santos, the new Prime Minister, favored a mixed economy with an important role for the private sector. The United States made no attempt to improve relations and blocked Angola’s admission to the United Nations. After years, in which the CIA had continually funded the rival groups and promoted a covert program to solicit European and American mercenaries to fight with the FLNA, the U.S., in 1988, offered to normalize relations with Angola. The offer had one condition–a mutual settlement with UNITA. The MPLA agreed, and in that year the MPLA and UNITA negotiated a regional peace agreement. Although UNITA members served in the new Angola government of Unity and Reconciliation, Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, rejected a UN monitored election and retreated back to the provinces. The war resumed after the failure of peace accords the parties had signed in November 1994.
The U.S. had only a negative policy in Angola–remove the Cuban supported group from power. The only replacement, Jonas Savimbi, had a more radical philosophy than the MPLA and yet the U.S. supported him for a long time. The Clinton administration withdrew support for Savimbi but he continued guerrilla tactics against the Angola government until his death in 2002. Primarily due to U.S. support of Jonas Savimbi, Angola is a ruined country and the people have suffered greatly. If Maoist Savimbi had gained power, what would the U.S. have done?
After the country slowly rebuilt itself from 27 years of civil war, the Angolan government budgeted for elevated economic growth in 2005, making the African nation one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. One notable source of funding for Angolan construction projects comes from China, that extended Angola a $2 billion credit line to rebuild roads, railways and bridges destroyed during the war.
Since Jonas Savimbi, originally propped up with U.S. support, passed from the scene, Angola’s mining and oil rich economy has been on a tear. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) assesess Angola’s economic growth at 14% in 2005 and expects Angola to record a substantial 25% growth in 2006.
Somalia
Somalia is another country that became caught in the East-West struggle. Muhammad Syad Barre, who became the Somalia leader after a bloodless coup in 1969, initially aligned his country with the Soviet Union. Problems with Ethiopia, a close ally of the Soviet Union, moved Syad Barre away from the East bloc and more towards an alignment with the Arab states. After the Ethiopians prevented the ethnic Somali that lived in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia from seizing the region, the U.S. agreed to provide humanitarian and military assistance to Somalia. In return, Somalia granted to the U.S. the naval base at Berbera that had previously been a Soviet naval base. As in other Third World countries, the United States found itself financing a leader whose regime slowly became repressive, corrupt and unpopular. Armed opposition to Barre started in 1988. On June 27, 1991, Siyad Barre, after ruling Somalia for 22 years, fled the country. The fighting that ensued between rival groups caused a societal breakdown that led to periodic famines. U.S. financial and military support had achieved nothing for Somalia.
In December 1992, the UN responded to Somalia’s anarchy and famines by dispatching a “peace-keeping” force that included 2000 U.S. marines. U.S. and UN policies in Somalia became intertwined. Nevertheless, U.S. actions in Somalia must be evaluated separately. And what were these actions? First, it appears that the U.S. humanitarian troops had arrived after the famine had subsided. News reports stated that the U.S. found no famine in the capital, Mogadishu. They expected to find it inland in Baidoa. No famine in Baidoa. The famine had retreated to the villages. Reports from the villages did not disclose famines. The UN and U.S. marines did not go home.
Instead, marines began house to house searches for weapons and caused several casualties in the searches. On June 5, 1993, UN troops attempted to close the radio station commanded by Mohammed Farah Aideed, one of the contenders for Somali leadership. Aideed had credentials. He had been a Somali ambassador and had been elected chairman of the United Somali Congress by a 2/3 vote. He declared his faction to be the legitimate Somalia government. In repelling the attack, Somali militiamen killed 24 Pakistani troops. This action propelled the U.S. forces into a five-month manhunt for Aideed. In the process, the marines engaged in several “shoot outs” with Somali, including the killing of two children who had climbed into marine vehicles and reached for their sunglasses. After 18 U.S. soldiers were killed and their corpses dragged through the Mogadishu streets, the U.S. military left Somalia.
According to the NY Times, December 8, 1993, UN/U.S. forces inflicted 6,000 to 10,000 casualties on the Somali. UN Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni estimated that 2/3 of the casualties were women and children. The Los Angeles Times, November 28, 1993, estimated that only a small fraction of the UN relief efforts benefited Somalia. Foreign business people profited from fast food sales to the UN soldiers, a $9 million sewer system in the UN/U.S. headquarters and helicopter flights for Western officials. Twenty years of U.S. policy in Somalia–anarchy, wasted money, many Somali and American dead.
Somalia finally obtained a new president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who had to go to Nairobi, Kenya in October, 2004 to be sworn into office. The new Transitional Federal Government, consisting of a 275-member parliament was established in October 2004, It also remained in Nairobi and has not established effective governance inside Somalia
Nevertheless, fighting continues.
Fighting between warring factions has continued since the country’s dictator Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted in 1991. Up to one million Somalis have died in the civil war due to fighting, famine and disease, and around two million have fled the country. Mogadishu, the capital, remains divided between tribal leaders with an estimated 60,000 armed men still roaming the streets. Yemen Times. Dec. 29, 2004.
On Dec. 19, 2004 the UN Security Council requested all countries to enforce an arms embargo against Somalia. Subsequently, rival leaders met, and on January 5, 2006, again signed a deal they hope will reunite Somalia, allowing the transitional parliament to assemble in the next 30 days for the first time on Somali soil.
Libya
U.S. policy towards Libya can be regarded as a policy of a country directed against one person– Muhammar Qadhafi. After Qadhafi engineered the Libyan 1968 military revolution, he served as President of the Revolutionary Council from 1969 to 1977, and afterwards as General Secretary of The People’s General Congress. He relinquished his duties as General Secretary of the General people’s Congress in March 1979 but remained as chief of the armed forces and a sometime Head of State. Today, Qadhafi does not hold any official public office and only assumes the title of Revolutionary Leader. Nevertheless, his detractors claim he is still the “unofficial” Head of State of a Libya that has a complete legislative branch with an elected head of government, a cabinet and a Supreme Court. Qadhafi has significant power in Libya, but by framing a policy that considers only his power, the U.S. disregarded other Libyan power blocs.
The U.S. accepted a revolutionary Libya that expelled all foreign forces and closed their bases. It could not accept:
Libya’s perceived attempts to unite the Arab world against U.S. diplomatic and military presence in the Middle East,
its initiatives against Israel,
its nationalization of an economy that displaced foreign interests, and
its weakening of foreign control of Libya’s oil resources.
Actually, few of these policies followed U.S. perceptions. Libya could not unite the Arab world against the U.S. Except for the oil price rises during the 1970′s, neither Libya nor the Arab world harmed Western economic interests; Libyan policies have had little effect on Israel’s development and the U.S. oil companies were reasonably satisfied with their business relationship in bringing low sulfur Libyan oil to market. Nevertheless, the U.S. adopted aggressive policies towards Libya that escalated the confrontation over the years. The thrust of these polices were to replace Qadhafi and stop Libya’s contribution to terrorism. It is obvious that the first stated policy has failed. The bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa and terrorist attacks in the U.S., none of which involved Libya, indicate that Libya’s contribution to the entire terrorism must have been small. The aggressive policy also exposed the error of a supposed belief that U.S. polices are dictated by the East-West conflict. After 1972, Libya had cool relations with the former Soviet Union.
Libya did not deny it had training grounds for recruits that represented a variety of national liberation movements and that it provided financial support to Palestinian liberation organizations. Nevertheless, the Libyan role was a minor counterbalance to the huge U.S. financial and military support of those who repressed liberation movements and, by authoritarian actions, caused international terrorism. Another significant point: Libya gained no economic or material benefit from its support of “liberation” movements. The Libyans declared in 1981 that, to them, it was a matter of principle. For the U.S., intervention has been mostly a matter of safeguarding interests and gaining economic benefits.
Libyans protested U.S. policy in Iran by burning the U.S. embassy in Tripoli in December 1979. On August 19,1981, U.S. jets downed two Libyan air force planes during U.S. maneuvers in the Libyan Gulf of Sidra. On March 25, 1986, U.S. navy planes bombarded civilian targets in Libya’s Gulf. They also attacked a Libyan Coast Guard boat in which all 10 sailors were reported killed. Another attack on a ship resulted in the crew leaving the ship. The Libyans claimed that all 42 men, while swimming to shore, were machine gunned to death.
U.S. intelligence agencies accused Libya of a terrorist attack on the LaBelle disco club in Berlin, Germany. Two U.S. servicemen were among those killed in the attack. President Reagan demanded retribution for the disco club bombing and, on April 14, 1986, the U.S. mounted air attacks on the Libyan mainland. In these attacks, a bombing of Qadhafi’s house killed the leader’s adopted child. In November 2001, a Berlin court convicted three Libyans and one Palestinian in the LaBelle disco club bombing. The attacks on Libya signaled U.S. determination to defend against any terrorist attacks on its citizens. The attacks did not accomplish its purpose. On December 21, 1988, Pan Am flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. One Libyan agent has been convicted in that bombing.
In 1992, U.S. sanctions, some of which were adopted by the UN, prohibited weapons contracts, economic ties and investment by US firms and most travel to Libya. On September 12, 2003, the UN security council lifted the 11-year-old sanctions against Libya. France and the United States abstained, but 13 other member states voted to lift the arms embargo and end the ban on flights to Libya.
Fear, miscalculation, mistrust and an unnecessary aggressiveness guided U.S. policy towards Libya. They exposed the fact that aggressive policies were not only driven by Cold War relations. Hundreds died and the Libyan people suffered from sanctions before the policy achieved an apparent success. On December 19, 2003, Qadhafi agreed to discontinue developments of weapons of mass destruction and permit nuclear arms inspections. After 30 years of failing to align Libya with American interests and after 30 years of havoc due to the conflict, can U.S. policy with Libya be considered a successful policy? Did Libya finally give up on its trust in the Arab world, run out of steam in an endless conflict or adjust to realities of the day and not to U.S. policies? Could a different policy have achieved the same objective thirty years earlier?
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Central America and Caribbean
The Monroe Doctrine warned countries outside the Western Hemisphere not to interfere in Latin America affairs. The Western Hemisphere protectorate policy that the United States established in 1821 did not exclude the U.S. from interfering in Latin American affairs. The cold war reinforced the interference. For the entire 19th century and almost the entire 20th century, the Latin American countries stagnated in poverty, illiteracy, corruption and disease. The active intervention in their affairs could not have been beneficial to them.
Cuba
What could be more damaging to the United States in the 1960′s than to have the Soviet Union gain a foothold close to U.S. shores and create missile bases within firing range of U.S. territory? U.S. foreign policy planners succeeded in accomplishing those situations. Washington did not comprehend diplomacy and compromise and responded to the Castro government’s agrarian reform and expropriation of U.S. properties by imposing a trade embargo. The embargo motivated Cuba to seek economic assistance from the world’s Socialist countries. This further angered the U.S. and Washington severed diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 1961. The U.S. followed the diplomatic break with a U.S. trained invasion force that landed at the ill-fated Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961. Ninety invaders from the Cuban exile community died and 1200 were captured. The legacy of the invasion? Castro, fearful of further attacks, succeeded in convincing the Soviet Union to provide a missile umbrella to counter further attacks. U.S. policy brought nuclear missiles close to its shores and the world close to nuclear war.
After settling the dispute by removing U.S. missile bases from Turkey and promising never to attack Cuba, the U.S., either from spite or more likely from not wanting an independent and socialist government to succeed in the Western hemisphere, continued a policy of isolating Cuba from the Latin American community and imposed additional sanctions. The “ups” and “downs” of U.S./Cuba relations couldn’t contain Cuba. The Caribbean country drew closer to the USSR and became a member of COMECON. Cuba provided combat forces for the government of Angola, for the Ethiopian regime in its war in the Ogaden, and for Socialist forces in Yemen. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Cuba economy collapsed. The U.S. has taken advantage of this collapse with additional embargoes and attempts at isolation. The perilous condition of the Cuban people approached starvation but did not deter America from its aggressive policy.
The Cuban policy almost brought the U.S. into a nuclear war. It had other damaging consequences:
An influx of Cuban refugees into Florida displaced black workers and created racial tensions.
Cuba mixed hardened criminals with refugees during the Mariel sealift and forwarded many criminals to the United States.
Foreign companies gained advantages over American companies in Cuban investments.
It’s Dec. 31, 2005, and 45 years to the day, Castro remains in power. The Cuban people suffer from American sanctions that are not forecasted to be less astringent in 2006. The success of the U.S. policy–maintaining Cuba in poverty so other nations in the Western hemisphere will see Cuba as an economic and social failure and thus realize that combating the U.S. is futile. However, recent trends indicate this strategy might backfire.
Cuba claims its GDP grew by 11.8 percent in 2005. Two “white knights” are contributing to Cuba’s success.
Havana, Dec 29 (Prensa Latina)
Rising exports and good trade relations with China directly contributed to the current economic performance of the Caribbean island. Nickel, oil and transport investments are in motion with China, together with large credit dealings, and well as with Venezuela, part of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, which has become a driving force of the Cuban economy.
Haiti
U.S. policy towards Haiti is analagous to U.S. policy towards Iraq–ignore the oppression, act after the damage is done, fail to create viable institutions and watch the new adminstration drift into catastrophe. Forecasting the future of Iraq might be done by studying Haiti’s past and present.
The U.S. Marines invaded a Haiti wrought with internecine warfare in 1915 and began a 19 year military occupation. The invasion commander, Rear Adm. William Caperton, Jr. categorized the intervention as a means to “protect American and foreign interests.’’ Marine Maj. Gen. Smedley Darlington Butler — the first commandant of the new U.S.-created Haitian constabulary — categorized his mission as a ’’glorified bill-collecting agency.’’
During the1920′s, American presidents Coolidge and Hoover introduced public works programs that energized Haiti’s economy. After the marines left, Haiti drifted back to chaos and corruption that culminated in the election of Francois Duvalier. Duvalier declared himself president for life in 1964.
Duvalier’s repressive and authoritarian rule angered the Kennedy administration and the U.S. suspended aid to Haiti in mid-1962. Nothing changed. Duvalier remained in power until his death in 1971. His 19 year old son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, became Haiti’s new leader. Unrest in Haiti continued and, in January 1986, the Reagan administration recommended the dictator’s departure. At the last minute, Jean-Claude decided to remain in Haiti.and his decision provoked violence.
After the United States Department of State cut aid to Haiti on January 31, 1986, the Haitian military forced Jean-Claude Duvalier to depart from Haiti on February 7, 1986. Haiti remained in economic decline and in 1990 the marginated population coalesced to elect liberation-theologian Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president of Haiti with 67% of the popular vote.
Aristide could not resolve Haiti’s economic and social problems or thwart his powerful opposition. On September 30, 1991, supposedly with CIA approval and U.S. intelligence officers present at army headquarters, Haitian soldiers staged a coup and Gen. Raoul Cedras became defacto leader of the country.
The overthrow of a legally elected democratic government and a perception of oppression that was reinforced by massive amounts of boat refugees aroused progressives in the United States and Black groups, such as the Black Caucus and TransAmerica, to petition the Clinton government for action against the Haitian government. Unlike the Cuban refugees during that era, the Haitian refugees were not permitted easy entry to the United States. The Clinton administration realized it could resolve the refugee problem by ousting the Haitian government and returning Aristide to power.
On July 31, 1994, the UN passed Resolution 940 that allowed the U.S. to lead a multinational force to force the departure of the Haitian military chiefs. At the last minute, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter managed to negotiate the exit of General Raoul Cedras and other Haitian leaders and permit a 28-nation multinational force of 20,000-strong, led by the United States, to enter Haiti. On 15 October 1994, Aristide returned to Haiti, and as part of Carter’s negotiated agreement, recovered his presidency.
Aristide’s governing repeated his earlier presidency — chaos, friction and economic decline. The consitution barred Aristide from serving a second term when his term elapsed in 1996 and Rene Preval provided a four year interlude for Aristide. On February 7, 1996, Preval was inaugurated as the President of Haiti. In the next election on November 26, 2000, Aristide was re-elected president and sworn in as Haiti’s president on February 7, 2001. Aristide ran virutally unopposed. Many opposition groups boycotted the election and accused his Lavalas Party of fraud.
Almost ninety years after the U.S. marines invaded Haiti in 1915 to bring stability to Haiti and end its internecine warfare, Haiti is in chaos and internecine warfare.
Haiti is the poorest nation in the Western hemisphere; GDP/capita year 2001 of $1860.
International observers are critical of the election that made Aristide president.
The opposition refused to recognise Aristide as president and a 15-party opposition alliance, Convergence, announced its own alternative president.
The Organisation of American States (OAS) said 10 Senate seats won by Aristide candidates should have gone to a second round vote.
Some countries haave threatened to withhold aid if the Aristide government does not revise the senate election results.
The European Union blocked $49 million in aid to Haiti, and $17.7m intended to help cover the country’s budget deficit was also suspended.
After mid-September 2003 and into the year 2004 hundreds have been killed in political violence.
Haiti Protests Draw Musicians, Artists — PETER PRENGAMAN, Associated Press Writer, Dec. 23, 2003.
PORT-AU-PRINCE, Haiti – Some of Haiti’s most famous musicians on Tuesday held a free concert calling for President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s resignation while artists painted rainbows over pro-government graffiti. The coalition of more than 1,000 musicians, painters and writers organized the demonstration at the University of Haiti to show solidarity with students who were attacked by Aristide partisans earlier this month. Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, has been in turmoil since Aristide’s Lavalas Family party swept flawed 2000 elections.
“When I was a student here 20 years ago I used to sing against the dictatorship,” said Sweet Mickey singer Michel Martelly, referring to Francois and Jean-Claude Duvalier. “Twenty years later nothing’s changed.”
In a repeat of past history Jean-Bertrand Aristide has been ousted and is in exile. UN peacekeepers struggle against anarchy. Haiti is back to 1984. And why? The New York Times. Jan. 29, 2006:
Mr. Curran (former U.S. ambassador) accused the democracy-building group, the International Republican Institute, of trying to undermine the reconciliation process after disputed 2000 Senate elections threw Haiti into a violent political crisis. The group’s leader in Haiti, Stanley Lucas, an avowed Aristide opponent from the Haitian elite, counseled the opposition to stand firm, and not work with Mr. Aristide, as a way to cripple his government and drive him from power, said Mr. Curran, whose account is supported in crucial parts by other diplomats and opposition figures.
Guatemala 1951 to 2004
In 1951, Guatemala elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, a reformer who considered the grievances of the lower and middle classes. By mentioning the words “land reform” and “organizing labor,” Arbenz and his intended policies infuriated the banana companies and U.S. politicians. In 1954, a group of Guatemala exiles, armed and trained by the CIA and commanded by Colonel Carlos Castillos Armas, invaded Guatemala and forced out the legitimately elected president. Since then, Guatemala has been ruled by military dictatorships. With U.S. military and economic assistance, these governments suppressed political activity and provoked those willing to seek political and social change by peaceful means into pursuing the changes by violent confrontations. After a brutal suppression of guerrilla activity, civilian leaders in 1985 returned to govern with the military watching in the wings. In 1996, the Guatemala government signed a peace accord with guerrilla forces and ended a conflict.
After the accords, a trail of evidence and admissions by the Guatemala military began to confirm what many had suspected: The U.S. government had linked itself to a suppression that some claim caused 110,000 Mayan Indian lives, and razed thousands of villages in an effort to destroy a guerrilla force estimated at 2,000 armed rebels. U.S. and Guatemala officials acknowledged that the CIA transferred millions of dollars to the Guatemala military and provided intelligence to their army. Another example of a U.S. policy that went full cycle and during the cycle brought a nation to self-destruction.
El Salvador 1972-2004
In 1972, a coalition led by Jose Napoleon Duarte, head of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), appeared to win the El Salvador presidential election. Instead of taking office he found himself arrested and exiled by the military. During the following years, a repressive military government maintained power and provoked left-wing guerrilla groups to overthrow an illegitimate government. Partly due to the urgings of the U.S. government, the military junta in January 1980 offered concessions to moderate and leftist groups. Duarte returned from exile to become the country’s leader. Despite social and economic reforms, the military still seemed to rule the nation.
The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a coalition of rebel forces, armed itself with a variety of military equipment, including leftover weapons shipped from the battle fields of Vietnam through Nicaragua and to the FMLN. The equipped FMLN declared war on the government. The war had two characteristics–an overt war between military forces and a war against civilian populations. It has been estimated that the latter war claimed the most lives. Right wing death squads terrorized the local villages and assassinated political opponents. In 1980, they killed Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, a Catholic “liberation” theologian. El Salvador troops violated and massacred four nuns. The wars escalated until the FMLN almost captured the entire country. The government repulsed the offensive and, although a “no-win” situation emerged, the violence continued.
The Reagan administration used counter-insurgency as the reason for interference in El Salvador affairs. Economic and military aid to El Salvador from 1981-1992 amounted to $1 million/day in a country of 5.2 million people, and became contingent on political and social reforms. El Salvador struggled for a democratic face and managed to have elections during that period. Military aid peaked at $197 million in 1984 and economic aid peaked at $462 million in 1987. The U.S. policy of countering insurgency and demanding reforms contradicted actuality. The U.S. did not demand the resolution of the murders of Romero, nuns and political opponents, and did not condemn the burning of villages and many other obvious human rights violations. U.S. troops advised the El Salvador military and secretly engaged in military operations. Amnesty International concluded that the paramilitary death squads received covert financial support and military training from the United States.
The El Salvador military realized that the collapse of the USSR meant the end of massive U.S. support. After years of war, the competing groups agreed in 1990 to peace talks. Under the agreement, the FMLN and the El Salvador government disbanded their respective forces and formed a new civilian police force that included National police and FMLN members. In a 1994 election, ARENA, the already established government, retained their power and the FMLN established itself as a legitimate opposition party that could operate without government suppression.
From the U.S. perspective, preventing the fall of an El Salvador government that might have led to government control by a leftist FMLN allied with the Soviet Union, vindicated Washington’s policy. U.S. policy did not prove effective until the country had destroyed itself.
El Salvador has not fully recovered from its civil war. GDP, real growth rate, is estimated at 1.8% (CIA Factbook, 2004 est.). GDP per capita, purchasing power parity is at $4,900 (CIA Factbook 2004 est.) Foreign remittances from emigrant workers support the economy. If the U.S. had been able to mediate the differences, and stop the destructive war much earlier, it could claim a successful policy.
Dominican Republic 1962-2004
U.S. interventions in Dominican Republic affairs have occurred often in the century. In 1962, the heir to Trujillo’s reign, Joaquin Balaguer, was defeated in an election by Dr. Juan Bosch, a leftist reformer. President Lyndon Johnson was occupied with the war in Vietnam and troubled by the Castro government in the Caribbean. He decided he could not afford another Castro type government close to America’s shores. Johnson dispatched U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic and engineered a military coup against the Bosch government. After that incursion, the Dominican Republic sailed on choppy seas of fraudulent elections, corruption, and economic uncertainty. In 1990, the two contestants whose election precipitated the 1962 incursion from the U.S., and who now were octogenarians, returned as contestants in the presidential election. U.S. interference had made its usual full cycle. In the cycle, the Dominicans greatly suffered.
Panama 1990-2004
U.S. relations with Panama’s Manuel Antonia Noriega were similar to U.S. relations with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. For years the U.S. governments tolerated Noriega’s authoritarian attitude. President Bush even praised him. When the United States declared drugs as a major threat to American society, and a Florida court indicted Noriega for drug trafficking and money laundering, the U.S. found a reason to remove Noriega from power. Having received mixed signals from the U.S. government over the years and believing that he had could reveal information that exposed the CIA and U.S. involvement in covert activities, Noriega felt immune from attack. His arrogant attitude provoked President Bush. In the absence of cold-war considerations, the United States proceeded with full-scale military intervention against Panama and removed an insignificant leader from power. The invasion exhibited unnecessary brutality. The U.S. military demolished impoverished Panamanian neighborhoods, where Noriega had major support. Many civilians were killed. The American military captured Noriega and the American judicial system convicted him and sentenced him to prison. The legality of all the operations is questionable.
The severity of the invasion of Panama and its aftermath decry a meaningful policy. Previous events indicated that Noriega, rather than assisting the drug trade, had impeded it. By using known narcotics dealers as informants against him at his trial, the prosecution did not make a compelling case. Besides, it is well known that in other countries, principally Mexico, the governments have been in collusion with leading narcotics dealers and the U.S. has not interfered with those governments. Panama’s involvement in drugs could never approach the large-scale involvement of Mexico, nor has the imprisonment of Noriega diminished the drug supply. Noriega may have used his military role in a despotic manner, but he was fair to the poor people of Panama and he was not a threat to the U.S. and the Central American area. The reasons for the U.S. military adventure in Panama are not clear. The most probable reason: to prevent President Bush from being humiliated by an insignificant dictator. U.S. policy towards a small country failed to use diplomacy and degenerated into a brutal military adventure.
What happened to Panama after the capture of Noriega? Here is one report:
Panamanians waited only four years after the invasion before restoring to government the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) that had been closely associated with the Torrijos and Noriega regimes. The 1994 election of PRD Presidential candidate Ernesto Pérez Balladares also displaced Guillermo Endara, a president ushered into office by the U.S. military and besieged during his term by reports of widespread government corruption. Before Endara completed the first year of his presidential tenure, the DEA had accused Endara’s law firm of dealings with several companies belonging to drug traffickers. The U.S. press also revealed Endara’s links to a bank suspected of laundering drug money.
International Relations Center, M a y 1 9 9 5 , Panama: A Test for U.S.-Latin American Foreign Relations, by John Lindsay-Poland
After years of mis-government and economic stagnation, Panama, which has mainly a service economy is showing economic progress. Services include operating the Panama Canal, banking, the Colon Free Zone, insurance, container ports, flagship registry, and tourism, all of which are on the increase as world trade, especially involving China, increases.
Grenada 1983-2004
Little Grenada threatened the U.S. mainland as much as City Island threatened New York. The Reagan administration did not favor having the hard-line Marxist, Bernard Coard, replace, in a coup, a moderate Marxist, Maurice Bishop. Citing anarchy, a state of martial law, the construction of an airport by Cuban construction workers that could be used for military flights, and a threat to American students at a Grenada medical school, the U.S. Marines invaded the island on October 25, 1983. President Reagan also told reporters that the Organization of East Caribbean States had requested the intervention. The facts did not entirely support the statements:
Coups and revolutions have been daily affairs in Latin America.
The martial law quieted an extreme situation.
The airport had European financing and was being constructed for tourist purposes.
The students did not seem disturbed until the Americans invaded. (Some students did express fear).
The Organization of American States (OAS) “deeply deplored” the invasion.
The UN Security Council voted 11 to 1 against the attack.
Two dozen Cubans, 18 U.S. military and 45 Grenadines died. When the caskets containing the Cuban dead arrived in Havana, U.S. reporters noted that most of the dead were men in their late fifties and sixties and were obviously not military personnel. Most of the Grenadines died in the U.S. military destruction of a mental hospital. The invasion timing, which was two days after a bomb in Beirut killed 241 Marines, led to a belief that the invasion intended to offset the U.S. failure in Lebanon and display military prowess close to home.
The U.S. assisted in completing the tourist airport. Nevertheless, little has been done for the Grenada economy and the nation remains extremely poor. Grenada expressed its attitude to the U.S. invasion by inviting Fidel Castro to the island 15 years after the invasion. The Cuban leader unveiled a bronze plaque at Port Salines airport terminal that honored the dead Cuban construction workers who had assisted in the airport construction. The plaque hangs besides a plaque that honors the U.S. Agency for International Development, which helped complete the airport the U.S. did not want built.
Nicaragua 1972-2004
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle, former proprietor of most of Nicaragua’s industry and resources, mishandled the country’s 1972 earthquake crisis and the international relief funds sent to alleviate the suffering. In an act of sympathy with the plight of the Nicaraguan people, the U.S. suspended military aid to Somoza and paved the way for Commandante Zero and his Sandinista compatriots, known as the FSLN, to seize power in 1979. President Jimmy Carter provided aid to the new administration. Within a year, the policy changed. Fearful that the Sandinistas were allied with Moscow, could spread their influence throughout Central America, and assisted the Salvador rebels Washington suspended aid and became belligerent against an administration it had indirectly assisted in achieving power. Despite the U.S. House of representatives passage of the Boland Act, that prohibited the U.S. from supplying arms to those opposed to the Sandinista regime (Contras), the Reagan administration “covertly” armed the Contras. In an effort to destroy the Nicaragua economy, the CIA mined Nicaragua’s harbors. In June 1986 the World Court sided with a Nicaragua law suit and found the U.S. guilty of violating international law.
The confrontation with Nicaragua escalated during the Reagan and Bush administrations. The Contras, illegally armed with U.S. funds from several sources, including those diverted in the Iran-Contra affair, ventured from bases in Honduras into parts of Nicaragua. They attacked and destroyed, but never held territory or convinced the Nicaraguan people to revolt. The actions had their toll and the Sandinista government wanted to end the bloodshed. The Sandinista government accepted the Arias Plan, devised by the Costa Rican president, and which had the support of Central American countries. Despite U.S. rejections of the plan, the plan was implemented. In 1990, Violeta Barios Chamorro represented an opposition party and defeated Daniel Ortega, the FSLN candidate, in internationally supervised elections. The Nicaragua government and the Contras signed a permanent cease-fire and the Contras demobilized. The Arias Plan brought the democracy and peace to Nicaragua that Washington had claimed as its objectives. Yet, Washington rejected the Arias Plan.
Nicaragua in 2004:
Sandinista Daniel Ortega, who received 42.3% of the vote in the 2001 election for president, has almost returned to power.
Former Nicaraguan president, Arnoldo Aleman has been convicted of corruption.
In 2002, the rescued Nicaragua had a GDP/capita of $2500, the lowest of all the Central American countries.
In 2004, The FSLN, Ortega’s Sandinista party, occupied 42% of seats in Nicaragua’s legislature.
Bolaños’ Liberal party became disillusioned with its own president and joined with the opposition Sandinistas to obstruct President Bolaños’ government reforms. The two joined forces also tried to remove Bolaños from office. In an usual twist to Nicaragua’s parody, Daniel Ortega, representing the Sandinista bloc, signed an agreement with Bolaños on Jan. 12, 2005 that permitted the president to finish his term.
The U.S. fortified the Contras in an effort to replace Sandinista Daniel Ortega. He is almost back in power.
South America
Since the 1821 Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. has interfered in Latin American politics. Governments have been toppled, leaders eliminated and economic policies steered to assist U.S. interests. In recent decades, the U.S. has been accused of complicity in the overthrow of Guatemala’s liberal nationalist Jacobo Arbenz (1954), Brazil’s leftist Joao Goulart (1964), Chile’s Marxist Salvador Allende(1973) and Bolivia’s nationalist Juan José Torres González (1971), in the prevention of Uruguay’s Frente Amplio Party taking power (1971), in arming El Salvador’s government to prevent El Salvador leftist rebels from taking power (1980′s), in military attacks against Social Democrat Juan Bosch in Dominican Republic (1963), Marxist Fidel Castro in Cuba (since 1960), Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinista government (1980′s), Grenada’s leftist government (1983) and Panama nationalist Manuel Noriega (1989), and in an intended coup against President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela (2002).
U.S. foreign policy projects the spread of democracy and capitalism to Third world nations. In South America, U.S. policies succeeded in creating turmoil and promoting opposition to its objectives. Almost every South American nation is presently adopting a course propelled by a left-leaning wind. The 2002 election of Worker’s Party candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva to Brazil’s presidency signaled a new Latin American political direction. Lulu’s election in Brazil set the stage for the election of indigenous labor leader Evo Morales to president of Bolivia on the first ballot and for the 53.5% win of Socialist candidate Michelle Bachelet for president of the Chile Republic. An early 2006 review of South American governments show:
Venezuela: President Hugo Chavez controls a government with vast oil riches that eschews distribution of the wealth and favors local rather than global agreements.
Brazil: Workers Party’s President Lulu da Silva leads one of the world’s more dynamic economies. Although troubled by party corruption and decreasing popularity, Lulu remains in a commanding position to dictate and not blindly follow.
Uruguay: President Tabaré Vasquez arrived in January 2005 with far left credentials and, although pursuing conservative domestic policies, he has become identified with Hugo Chavez’s global policies. Argentina: Argentina’s president, Nestor Kirchner at the Summit of America’s meeting in November, 2005, emphasized his nation’s independence by saying that past American policies “not only generated misery and poverty but also a great social tragedy that added to institutional instability in the region, provoking the fall of democratically elected governments.” Kirchner has aligned his government with the policies of the other Socialist leaning presidents of South America.
Bolivia: Evo Morales, who has titled himself as ”Washington’s nightmare,” achieved a spectacular victory as a populist candidate. Morelos wants to use Bolivia’s extensive gas reserves to benefit the nation’s less fortunate citizens, who inhabit most of the country.
Chile: Socialist Michelle Bachelet won the January 15 run-off for president.
Ecuador: Leon Roldos Aguilera is critical of the U.S. and is slightly favored in the upcoming Ecuador election. Analysts believe his government would “tend to be leftist in matters of security or politics, but rightist in terms of economics.”
The other failure of U.S. policies is the rise of South American nationalism. The proliferation of Socialist and anti-American governments throughout South America portends U.S. weakness and the inability of the American government and military to exert control over South American affairs. The failure to adopt the U.S. sponsored Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) during a 34-country summit in Mar del Plata, November 2005, indicates that the momentum is towards complete independence from U.S. domination. An economically strong Brazil is showing the way, an oil rich Venezuela and its captivating leader are providing incentives and leading the charge, and a newly directed Argentina is displaying what can be done when not tied to the dollar and also how to use intellectual oratory to influence populations. The U.S. can still hope and expect that many of the governments will fail in their social and economic endeavors and U.S. capital and advice will still be needed. However, that expectation has a significant impediment – the entry of China into South American affairs.
China is breathing heavily in South America. The Asian nation is only in an early stage of possibly replacing the United States as a force in South America, but exhibits an advantage. The Chinese government has neither interest in its partners’ politics nor their ideologies. It only wants to trade raw materials for its basic manufactured goods. The Chinese can supply manpower and knowledge for building infrastructure but it is reluctant and limited in furnishing capital. The United States operates with strings–it wants assurance of friendly politics and is often concerned with a nation’s ideology, but can supply huge amounts of capital and technology for creating infrastructure.
Will the U.S. realize the counter-productive aspect of its policies towards South America? The United States has a new role with South America nations. These nations are growing and expanding their trade. The U.S. needs Latin American raw materials and Latin America needs U.S. capital and high technology goods. If South American leaders want to establish a regional order that guarantees their sovereignties and buffers them from being continually disrupted by U.S. old world disorder, the U.S. can assist in this realization and greatly profit from it. Failure to recognize and take advantage of the changing winds of South America is a sure path to decay.
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Conclusions
Viewed totally and over many years, U.S. foreign policy has not exhibited diplomacy. The policies almost always degenerated into military ventures that did not accomplish politival objectives. It seems incredible, but it can be shown that since the end of World War II, U.S. interventions throughout the world resulted in the deaths of more than two million persons, wounded and maimed many more, caused dislocations, uprooted of masses of persons and destroyed infrastructures and economies. The American people have sent their children to die in several fruitless interventions that served no beneficial purposes.
The Cold War served as an excuse for many illegitimate policies. Most interventions did not resolve Cold War issues and usually resulted in attacks on powerless countries. Similar provocation occurred after the end of the Cold War. It’s unfortunate that the American people have been unable to fulfill their responsibility and prevent the disasters their governments have caused. U.S. foreign policies have had a habit of going full circle–the adversary conditions they intended to change have often returned. The trajectories of the explosive weapons used to quell the adversary may someday follow a similar pattern–returning to explode at the original place of manufacture.
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alternativeinsight
updated january 31, 2006
originally published july, 1999
http://www.alternativeinsight.com/Foreign_Policy_Failures.html#Middle-East
